Gillespie, Richard - Soldiers of Peron. About Critical History Juvenile prostitution Montoneros Richard Gillespie - Soldiers of Peron. On Montoneros Critical History (2008) [Ed Sudamericana]
Richard Gillespie, an English teacher born in Wigan, Lancashire, in 1952, lived in the Argenlina between June 1975 and October 1976, as she gathered material on the Peronist left with a view to his doctorate, he received in 1979 - He was Junior Research Fellow (Political Science, St John's College, affiliated to the University of Oxford. Luesjo a professor of that subject at the University of Warwick and since 2000 is professor at the University of Liverpool. Soldiers of Perón addition, first published in English in 1981, then in English in 1987 and 1998 and now present the third edition, written by John William Cooke: Peronism allernativo (1989), History of the English Socialist Party (1991) and Spain and the Mediterranean (2000).
The first English edition appeared Soldiers of Peron in 1987, quickly became a best seller when Argentina has struggled with burning the revolutionary process in the seventies. Written by British researcher Richard Gillespie, who studied the phenomenon montonera culture in situ, it is a critical and rigorous history of the main urban guerrilla force that existed in Latin America, a thorough and robust study could never be refuted and deserves careful re-reading today.
The book explains how it was possible that a small group of radical Catholics developed a very influential and effective force, and why, despite having considerable popular support, resorted to a strategy increasingly militarized fatally ended by isolating Argentina society.
In this third edition, which keeps intact the original values \u200b\u200bof the work, Gillespie prologue introduces a new high Today, in which links and draws analogies between the Montoneros controversial and picket movement born in 2001, which enjoyed its heyday under the Kirchner administration. At a time when it is practiced from the Casa Rosada seventies marketing and while many of those members of the Peronist left have become the official Democratic officials, is to recall the final words of the new preface to Gillespie: "The moral convictions of Violence still valid, but can not replace historical analysis that seeks to understand what happened.
PERÓN SOLDIERS
criticism of the Montoneros History Translation
ANTONI Pigrau
INTRODUCTION
What you will read in the pages that follow, is the story of madness. Crazy at first seized the spirit of a handful of boys belonging to upper middle classes, and then infects the entire social body Argentina. It was, initially, almost quixotic adventure, crossed the lofty ideals: an end to social injustice, to oppose the authoritarianism of an illegitimate regime, break the hypocrisy and conventionality of the dominant forces. But these objectives, which could be shared even in its diffuse exposure, were degraded when they tried their achievement through permanent and systematic use of terrorist violence. In a few years, Argentina ended up becoming a wild country where the armed struggle was exalted as an end in itself, any crime was justified and political competition was simply a bet on the quality of machine guns and efficiency to fly an enemy: the ceremonial of the "pipe", the tragic eroticism of death. Much of the blame for this collective madness corresponds to the movement that Professor Richard Gillespie described in this book.
The distressing consequences we say, came an initial insincerity. Montoneros was established early-mind with items that had nothing to do with Peronism. At one point warned that their efforts would turn into the void if they did not connect with the mass movement, even in the inorganic forcing a power de facto policy that had been frozen, kept alive and fresh the powerful myth of Peron, nostalgia a time during which the people would have been happy, and hope for their return. So Montoneros drivers dressed as Peronist. Adopted the slogans that people instinctively raised and radicalized Peronist: no more "Perón returns" but "Perón and death." Were erected as judges of the movement that infiltrated, "Rucci, traitor, you will happen to you what happened to Vandor. Confiscation were the memories of Evita and did an exclusive flag: "If Evita were alive, would montonera." Boasted of their procedures: "These are the Montoneros Aramburu was killed." Claimed for themselves the condition of purity Peronist authentic and original this lie came to gain the allegiance of much of the Peronist people.
Thus
. Montoneros was becoming master of something that looked like the truth PJ. Accustomed to the taste of mass violence, every bloody act was applauded by people who neither own at the time Perón president, was drawn into these territories. And the initial lie Montoneros was completed with another, that it was pleased to leave Perón developed: the idea that
Peronist leader was a revolutionary, a sort of Mao or Fidel that would power a transformation so vast as of these drivers as soon as you put in front of the country's destiny.
What began with a lie and continued with another, which was carried out through violent means, fascists, could have no other purpose than it did.
I put it in my view mitigate any exculpatory formalize: the Montoneros always disgusted me. By their methods first, but also for its puerile and blunt objects and even by the genuine warmth of its leaders. I do not feel the slightest admiration for them. No doubt some members were brave, but many showed weakness when it came time to meet or semi-official forces. It was one thing to shoot Aramburu in the basement of an abandoned room,
or surround a village in the mountains of Cordoba, and quite another to confront the power of a State, as did their enemies, would not be limited to any ethical standard. At this juncture, where it was not to kill unarmed people but surprise and testing operations to kill or be killed, the Montoneros demonstrated the weakness of their belief, theoretical suformación failures, the mistakes of its strategy and the insincerity of their adherence to a political stance adopted by opportunism. Now he knows what he vaguely guessed at the time of Videla: the incredible partnership of many former Montoneros in the betrayal of his former colleagues. Rarely has there been in our history the example of betrayal as miserable as them. The final flight of the main heads, leaving in the lurch to the second line, orders sent to their deaths in 1978 to leaders punished for their dissent, the tilinguería of your driving in exile, dealing with the military ceremonial organization, complete the characterization of the moral standing of the group. A group that, lest we forget, he managed to handle the Peronist Youth, college took over and was, albeit briefly, in the privacy of Argentine power in 1973.
For this reason, I find it incomprehensible that intellectuals who had become a daily exercise of rational thought, have advised and even shared operational responsibilities to a group whose campaigning was based on death. I can not assume that, faced with a military regime, they blend in with the military in the language, hierarchical gradation, the protocol and the call for uniforms. Hallo unjustifiable attitude politicians, artists, priests, unionists, journalists and others who, out of snobbery or calculation, helped create a climate of sympathy Montoneros or intended to give political hierarchy secret process conclaves where certain characters, they were condemned to death and executed such judgments. Very sick should be our country so that these aberrations occurred!
My background relieve me, I think, to clarify that it makes me disgusted with the brutal repression that was razed Montoneros and other similar groups. Who, like me, condemns violence in all its forms, can not justify the methods used by the State or their delegates parastatals in indiscriminate repression that skipped all the legal and ethical categories that limit. At last. Montoneros and the like used in the violence that often erupts in the heart of any society, but when the State, through its armed forces, which trap for fools with the exercise of brutality, coercion, torture, murder, then the whole legal architecture of the community collapses. At the end of the day. Montoneros was nothing but a group of "armed proud" to use the words of Pablo Giussani. The repressive state, however, meant the degradation of the highest EU institution.
May seem out of place these personal statements. But it happens that while reading this book, I relived in my mind those awful years that any civilized standard seemed to have disappeared in my country, destroyed their political tradition by a seemingly unstoppable wind of dementia. Also, my trials come as compensation to the deliberate asepsis that Gillespie Professor Montoneros chronicles, from its source to its final disintegration. The author does well in such stories. It is not Argentina, and the trajectory of the "Soldiers of Peron" is for him a research subject, and nothing else.
For us, the people of this land. Montoneros is one of the nightmares we live since the late sixties until recently tiempo.Porque this group is closely associated with those terrible years, because his own frustration showed that even noble ideals Enron when trying to get through means negligible, because many of the young men who fell on behalf of the black flag could have been great leaders, for all this, Professor Gillespie's book is important and timely.
has safely navigated the waters of this deceptive organization whose secrecy covering their reality. He has collected all possible information. He followed the events thread confusing and ambiguous to the full extent necessary.
On the facts and names registered by Professor Gillespie, readers Argentina ratified the lesson that gave them the events themselves. For in the final analysis, history, and Goethe said it is also done to get rid of it.
FELIX LUNA 1986
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
The publication of third edition of Soldiers of Peron-twenty years after the first edition in Castilian and more of A quarter century after the original English edition, gives me pleasure to know that this work still relevant in Argentina, despite the generational change. I am glad to see that a book was a piece of contemporary analysis, written during the last phase of the insurgency montonera, reappears today as a history book, but at the same time I wonder why? Is it possible that in Argentina, a country with a reputation to live more in this than thinking about the past, has increased public interest in books on national history? Argentine university in the world, yes I have the impression that there has been more interest researchers in the era of the sixties and seventies, using the freedom to enter this field since the end of the military era. While for a wider audience, the potential interest of the book now seems to lie more in the political influence that has had the period of the guerrilla in relation to the Argentina of today and the recent past.
course, there were major political changes in Argentina from the eighties, and today the political violence lacks the legitimacy that once had for important sectors of society. However, the economic model and lack of social commitment of some governments elected under democracy as a result bring the life of a vibrant tradition of social protest that still excites many nationalistic and leftist militants. Among them, highlights the phenomenon of "pickets", a group of unemployed, yet social movement that sparked the radical core support and got to have strong impact, especially in December 2001, becoming an important factor in election of Nestor Kirchner as president.
What's interesting is not so much individual continuity montoneros survivors in other political or social movements, but political influence as a model Montoneros of some kind of insurgency, a model that ultimately failed, but nevertheless continues to offer similar profile political activists in Argentina and other countries, some lessons on how to act and how not to act in comparable situations (and to some point in different situations, given the possibility of extracting elements of the strategy for tactical use or adapt to other conditions.) Specifically, those who tried to promote the picketers as a social movement seeking an extra-parliamentary form of sociopolitical action that would prevent the social rejection that found the Montoneros in its final phase and that both were more difficult to suppress by the State.
ties that linked the Montoneros were picketers at strategic level in the sense that, while the urban guerrilla war led to popular forms was rejected, the protesters kept the emphasis on direct action, not excluding the whenever violence, "mass" - and seized some guerrilla methods at the tactical level.
I will not attempt to comprehensively assess the phenomenon picket. My argument is that they were aware of the experience montonera when raised its own strategy. Essentially, they sought a form of direct action that was more difficult to combat police or military, and would complicate the justification for repression. Militants regularly pickets had no weapons, and even when used improvised or homemade weapons, more difficult (compared to "operational" guerrillas in the past) the application of repressive measures by the authorities and law enforcement. While resort to violent methods, learned from the experience of the importance of urban guerrilla to prevent fatalities, selecting as targets various properties, particularly the headquarters of large multinational companies
and institutions. Furthermore, in contrast to the elitist initiatives of the urban guerrilla, the protesters chose to collective action, seeking to maintain their own security in the mass struggle, to avoid isolation and the insurgents of the past. Finally, rejected the "apparatus" of the Montoneros, organization always headed by a supreme command consists of guerrilla leaders, who controlled a range of support equipment and infrastructure. Instead of becoming bureaucratic, the protesters used the citizens' assemblies to discuss
initiatives aimed at the action, a way of making decisions which in turn made it difficult for authorities to distinguish between leaders and the base. Surely, it was a way to act more vulnerable to infiltration, but with less impact on the survival of the movement in the case of the bureaucratic-military structures of the Montoneros.
was how the protesters adopted elements of the Strategy montonera and, more importantly, learned of the "errors" committed by the applicants to "Soldiers of Peron." Maybe they found some similar obstacles: despite some discrimination in practice the focus of violent activity, the two movements were limited to difficult targets chosen at first.
The picketers lost the sympathy of many citizens to destroy private cars during street battles. The direct action drama had its appeal, but only for a while, and then began to be perceived as a nuisance rather than complicated everyday life.
After all, the two movements had more impact as forces of resistance or protest in
fulfilling its political and social objectives. However, his experience as a source of lessons for anyone interested in the political and social change is still relevant in Argentina, given the number of people disenchanted with the status quo contemporary.
The Montoneros and other comparable organizations, despite of their historic defeat, remaining as a reference point, and this is due mainly to represent a particular strategic approach.
political pragmatism in deciding the Montoneros-defined as a Peronist, to act within the Peronist movement and trying to make policy in combination with armed activity "should not obscure the fact that usually the activity of the organization was informed through a well thought out strategy and disseminated through press releases and interviews granted by the commanders. As I try to argue in the book, in the long term, the strategy montonera exhibited obvious flaws and contradictions, especially when its members were inspired too heavily on the experience of revolutions in other parts of the world (especially China, with its interpretation Maoist), and militarism are overly stressed. But despite his success and the great cost in human suffering it brought, the case of Montoneros maintains a prominent place in the history of the insurgency, as the example of urban guerrilla has had more success on the world.
Therefore, the issue of Montoneros is not relevant only to the Argentines who want to learn from their
own history, but to an international audience. Like it or not, the Montoneros and other guerrilla formations returned to Argentina "relevant" as a laboratory for the study of the insurgency. It is an achievement to hold or to adopt a model and ideal. But yes, the history of the Montoneros means an episode of conflict, beyond the tragedy and pain, is very rich political lessons. Lessons are debatable, no doubt, and the only way to clarify the issues in dispute is engaging in the debate in a rational and thoughtful manner, with the help of a growing literature on social science and history. The moral condemnation of violence are still valid, but can not replace historical analysis that seeks to understand what happened.
RICHARD GILLESPIE
Chester, January 2008
